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 Abstract Studies on societal path dependencies tend to focus on mechanisms that anchor
 and stabilize national trajectories while paying less attention to transnational interactions
 and multilevel governance. This paper explores processes of path transformation in
 societies that are presumed to have the characteristics of open systems. Two pairs of case
 studies are presented and compared. The first illustrates institutional change through
 collision, when a national path meets with another. The second describes the emergence of
 transnational institutional paths and the impact of that process on national institutions and
 their (potential) transformation. The results indicate that path transformation often stems
 from a gradual succession and combination of incremental steps and junctures - change is
 gradual but consequential. They also point to increasing co-evolutionary interaction
 between national path transformation and transnational path creation. This implies a need
 for analytical tools that are adapted to the analysis of multi-level, nested processes of
 institutionalization and de-institutionalization. The paper suggests that the concept of path
 generation allows for a better specification of the conditions for change in existing societal
 paths and for the emergence of new paths in the case of open systems than the concept of
 path dependency.
 Path dependency is a frequently used concept in the social sciences. In the general sense
 (soft version), it refers to the idea that events occurring at an earlier point in time will affect
 events occurring at a later point in time. In a stronger sense, path dependency characterizes
 historical sequences in which contingent events set institutional patterns with deterministic
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 properties into motion. Trajectories that stabilize technological developments as a result of
 increasing returns are a prime example. The varieties of capitalism literature or the post-
 socialist transformation literature oscillate in their use of the concept of path dependency
 between these two poles. On the whole, and whatever the version considered, path
 dependency arguments tend to focus on mechanisms that anchor and stabilize trajectories
 while paying less attention to the sources and mechanisms of change. In the strongest
 versions of path dependency, path transformation is presumed to be highly unlikely except
 through rare radical ruptures or reorientations, which are often associated with violent
 external shocks.
 In this article, we concentrate on the process of change and more particularly on the
 process of change in systems that are presumed to be open. We focus on institutional "rules
 of the game" and attempt to discover what happens to institutional paths when they
 confront and collide with other institutional paths. National institutional systems are highly
 structuring and powerful systems, but they are increasingly open in at least two ways. First,
 they closely interact and interplay with each other. Second, they are increasingly set and
 nested within higher-order i.e. transnational institutional frames (Djelic and Quack 2003b;
 Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006). An institutional system is therefore a "moving target"
 with many points of interface. We are primarily interested in the consequence of such an
 open and dynamic context for path dependency.
 To approach this question, we use two pairs of case studies. The first illustrates
 institutional change through collision, when a national path meets with another.
 Specifically, we investigate the attempted transfer of the US competition regime to German
 product and financial markets after World War II. The second illustrates the creation and
 generation of transnational institutional paths and the impact of that process on national
 institutions and their (potential) transformation. Specifically, we compare the establishment
 of two transnational rule setting and negotiating bodies: the IASB (International
 Accounting Standards Board) and the ICN (International Competition Network).
 Parallel analysis of the two pairs of cases generates a number of insights, which are
 summarized in the Conclusions section. First, we find that path transformation cannot
 always be traced to clearly identifiable single ruptures. Instead, it may come about through
 the gradual succession and combination of a series of incremental steps and junctures. This
 may be described as gradual but consequential change (Djelic and Quack 2003b: 309) or
 "incremental change with transformative results" (Streeck and Thelen 2005b: 9). Second,
 both pairs of cases reveal roads with many junctions and a multiplicity of interlinked and
 interacting dynamic paths - all "crooked" and reflecting long periods of struggle between
 countervailing pressures. The picture, in each case, is much more complex than that of a
 single linear path or a single crooked path. We propose a concept of path generation as
 complementary to that of path dependency. Path generation refers to the creation of a new
 path or to significant deviation from an existing path through the succession of small,
 sometimes apparently inconsequential steps, through the aggregation of multiple decision
 points and critical junctures. Finally, we find increasing co-evolutionary interaction between
 national path transformation and transnational path generation. This calls for, we suggest,
 analytical tools that are adapted to multi-level, nested processes of institutionalization and
 de-institutionalization.
 This article has four main sections. The first gives an overview of the debates on change
 in and around the existing path dependency literature. The second and third sections
 summarize the empirical results from our case studies, which have been described in detail
 and published elsewhere (Botzem and Quack 2006; Djelic 1998, 2002; Djelic and Kleiner
 2006; Djelic and Quack 2005; Quack and Djelic 2005). A comparison of developments in
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 these cases illustrates and reveals the limits of classical path dependency accounts. The
 concluding section draws from this comparison a number of theoretical insights on
 institutional development and change and puts forward suggestions for the future study of
 "path generation."
 Path dependency and institutional change: a review
 The concept of path dependency used in social sciences has a number of different
 meanings, but a common thread is a critical perspective on traditional efficiency arguments.
 The notion of "path dependency" suggests that the evolution of institutions, organizations
 or practices does not necessarily follow a pure logic of efficiency. Early steps can, in certain
 circumstances, lead to the stabilization of less efficient solutions. Beyond this common
 critical agenda, different versions of the path dependency argument are associated with
 varying views on institutional stability and institutional change.
 Variations of the concept of path dependency
 The weak form of path dependency is simply the general idea that "what has happened at
 an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring
 at a later point in time" (Sewell 1996: 262f). This soft version of path dependency is present
 either explicitly or implicitly in history and in some social scientific work with a historical
 focus. It does little more than acknowledge that contemporary behavior is constrained by
 the aggregation of past actions and decisions and that "innovation" is in a sense "bounded"
 (Weir 1992). Such descriptive accounts of successions of events rarely identify the
 mechanisms by which constraints are structured, reproduced or transformed. A number of
 social scientists within more nomothetic traditions describe this particular version of path
 dependency as having little "theoretical bite" (Mahoney 2000).
 The path dependency tradition in economics and political science, on the other hand, is a
 tradition with much stronger theoretical claims. In the words of Mahoney (2000: 507),
 "path dependence characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which contingent
 events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic
 properties." This particular interpretation of path dependency can be traced back to the
 work on technological trajectories by economic historians such as David (1985) or Arthur
 (1989). This argument reconciles a view of contingent beginnings with an understanding
 that these contingent first steps create a path with deterministic effects. Once entered upon,
 a path generates "increasing return effects" that will stabilize and entrench it, turning it into
 a deterministic frame (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000). This concept of path dependency
 implies that equilibrium is stable and highly deterministic, but also temporary. At some
 point, the path will come to an end and a new set of contingent events will provoke a
 radical and partly unexpected reorientation. Garud and Karnme (2001) suggest that
 entrepreneurs, qua knowledgeable agents, can generate and champion developments in
 technological fields. The cumulative effects of experimentation and bricolage might lead to
 the creation of a new path at certain points in time. Schreyogg et al. (2003) further specify
 that path dependency only exists if increasing returns generate a momentum that gradually
 limits the range of possible behaviors of the actors involved until a lock-in ultimately
 occurs. Alternatively, decreasing returns may lead to path transformation or facilitate the
 creation of a new path. The logic that characterizes the moment of origin of the path is thus
 radically different from the logic of its stabilization and reinforcement. However, this
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 version of the path dependency argument sees both logics as equally important and
 complementary.
 The literature on national business systems or varieties of capitalism suggests another
 reading of the path dependency argument (Whitley 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001). Situated
 at the crossroads of economic sociology and political science, this literature explores how
 national institutional settings influence, constrain or determine economic behaviors and
 interactions. Those institutional frameworks are generally considered to be deterministic of
 economic behaviors and interactions at any point in time. Traditionally, less attention has been
 paid to the logics behind their reproduction. The systematic identification of reproduction and
 stabilization mechanisms, the analytical description of exactly how those institutional systems
 persist, resist, and become entrenched is only a recent preoccupation in that literature (Crouch
 2005b; Crouch and Farrell 2002; Morgan et al. 2005; Lane 2005). The double issue of the
 origins of and change in structuring institutional frameworks has been rather neglected, and
 the idea of contingent beginnings or breaking points, as present in the strong version of path
 dependency identified above, is largely absent.
 In contrast, the post-socialist and post-communist transformation literature often focuses
 on critical moments or moments of "exceptional politics" (Stark 1992; Johnson 2001).
 These moments, though, are read and interpreted differently. Critical moments (such as the
 fall of communism) can be seen as real breaking points and "contingent (new) beginnings."
 They open the way to a new and possibly quite different path. This is the optimistic
 interpretation of "agency-centered theories," as referred to by Johnson (2001: 254). One
 may argue, on the other hand, that critical moments find their limits in stubbornly-
 entrenched institutional legacies. In what Johnson (2001: 254) calls "structure-based
 theories," the weight of past and pre-existing paths strongly constrain and limit the impact
 of even the most apparently radical ruptures. Stark and Bruszt (1998) aptly refer to this as
 "past dependency."
 Path dependency and system stability
 The various path dependency arguments naturally approach the issue of institutional stability
 in different ways. Weak historicist versions give no clear specification of the mechanisms
 through which institutional legacies are entrenched or reproduced. In fact, institutional
 stability is not necessarily presumed as "contingent, unexpected, and inherently unpredictable
 events...can undo or alter the most apparently durable trends of history" (Sewell 1996: 264).
 The strong variant of the path dependency argument has its origins in economics and
 economic history and a large follow-up in political science. Its proponents pay more
 attention to the issue of entrenchment and reproduction mechanisms. This variant
 distinguishes very clearly between moments of innovation, beginnings, or reorientation,
 and longer phases of stabilization and institutional reproduction. The logic driving
 beginnings or reorientation is quite different from the logic that prevails in the stabilization
 phase. Early steps are likely to be somewhat contingent but they then lead to a near-
 deterministic path. Institutional stability emerges from increasing returns that follow from
 an initial choice or a step in one particular institutional direction. This idea is akin to the
 concept of "first mover advantage." Increasing returns can be explained by high initial or
 set-up costs, learning and coordination effects, and adaptive expectations, e.g., when actors
 stick to particular institutions because they expect others to adopt or support them as well
 (Deeg 2001, 2005; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000).
 In the original work of economists and economic historians, the acknowledged
 mechanisms for institutional reproduction had utilitarian underpinnings (Arthur 1989;
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 David 1985; North 1990). Political scientists have made their own contribution by pointing
 to a few non-utilitarian mechanisms - such as power or policy feedback - that may also
 help to entrench and reproduce institutional frameworks (Mahoney 2000). Here, power is
 understood as institutionally embedded power in that different institutional settings provide
 societal actors variable access to different types of power resources. But once again, one
 should stop short of drawing deterministic conclusions since institutionally embedded
 power resources are likely to be rather unspecific; for example, the way and degree to
 which given players will be able to mobilize different power resources is likely to depend
 strongly on the particular actor constellation at a given point in time (see Djelic 1998;
 Jacoby 2000).
 Power and policy feedback emerge as particularly significant mechanisms in post-
 socialist or post-communist transformation writings that emphasize stability and institu-
 tional entrenchment. As Johnson suggests, "structure-based theories" point to the fact that
 "conditions of uncertainty typically reinforce old networks and patterns as people turn
 towards the familiar and the safe" (Johnson 2001: 254).
 Although the national business systems or varieties of capitalism interpretation of path
 dependency has given pride of place to stability and reproduction of institutional systems, it
 has only recently started to pay systematic attention to the issue of mechanisms ensuring
 such stability and reproduction (Amable 2003; Aoki 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001; Morgan
 et al. 2005). This literature focuses on complex institutional systems with multiple
 institutional subsystems and reveals additional entrenchment and reproduction mechanisms
 associated with the complementarity, interdependence and coherence of those subsystems.
 Each subsystem reinforces the others, and the mere interaction of those complementary or
 coherent subsystems contributes to further stabilizing the system as a whole.
 The key mechanisms identified in the path dependency literature therefore include
 increasing returns, power and policy feedback, and institutional complementarities.
 Legitimacy-seeking and socialization are two further mechanisms that can reinforce and
 stabilize emerging path-dependency. The sociological literature emphasizes the importance
 of these mechanisms for institutional stability (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Beyer 2006;
 DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Tolbert and Zucker 1996), but the
 connection with the path dependency argument as such is rarely made. We suggest that it
 should. A "logic of appropriateness" (March and Olsen 1998) and normative and cognitive
 alignment underlie the quest for legitimacy or socialization processes. Champions of
 institutional innovations need to find support, allies and relays to turn a fragile initiative
 into a new institutional path. New institutional developments will only be successful if their
 champions find ways to secure legitimacy. Ultimately, socialization can lead to a
 transparency of structuring and institutional frameworks and thus to "invisible" reproduc-
 tion. This is probably one of the most powerful kinds of stabilization mechanisms,
 suggesting profound entrenchment and generating great legitimacy.
 Models of change and their limits
 The historicist interpretation of path dependency is not associated with a "model" of change
 per se. Nevertheless, change is highly plausible in that variant, and there is no sense of
 regular periodicity - such as long periods of stability and rare moments of change. Change
 comes about in unexpected ways and in an irregular fashion, mostly through a combination
 of contingent developments and agency that are described but not theorized.
 The strong variant of path dependency also acknowledges the possibility of change, but
 holds it to be essentially rare and occurring in radical ruptures. The image or model of
 '2 Springer
 166 Theor Soc (2007) 36:161-186
 change is one of punctuated equilibrium. Specific breaking points with a clear and short
 time-span become critical junctures for future developments. Moments of change or radical
 reorientation are rare and sometimes reflect contingent developments (Mahoney 2000).
 These contingent developments or pressures for change tend to be seen as external to the
 system. They are external shocks that force along a re-railing, the logic of each path being
 entrenchment, stability and reproduction.
 The national business systems or varieties of capitalism interpretation of path de-
 pendency leaves even less space for change and models of change (Crouch and Farrell
 2002). Its original focus on static comparisons has now been combined with the perception
 that increasing return effects at the level of each institutional subsystem are reinforced
 by the complementarity or coherence of the various subsystems to give a picture of
 profound entrenchment of national institutional systems and nearly unshakable stability,
 even in the face of external shocks (Hall and Soskice 2001; Maurice and Sorge 2000;
 Whitley 1999).
 The post-socialist and post-communist transformation literature has traditionally been
 hesitant here. Radical ruptures are often said to create the opportunity for contingent (new)
 beginnings, with change following upon and reflecting powerful agency often of a political
 kind (Hanson 1998). Other investigators have underscored the "stickiness" of institutional
 legacies and do not allow for a theorization of change (Murrell 1995).
 More recent contributions move away from the simplistic alternative between rare and
 radical change and powerful path dependencies (Campbell and Pederson 1996; Campbell
 2004; Djelic and Quack 2003a; Garud and Karnme 2001; Johnson 2001; Stark 1992; Sorge
 2005; Streeck and Thelen 2005a; Thelen 2003). These contributions suggest gradual but
 transformative change. They identify a number of mechanisms that open up the possibility
 for change, even from within the system itself. Campbell and Pederson (1996: 207) find
 that "revolutionary change" in post-communist societies often "embodied significant
 evolutionary qualities." Stark (1992) suggests that institutional transformations "are more
 likely to entail processes of complex reconfigurations of institutional elements rather than
 their immediate replacement." Padgett (2001) makes a parallel argument for organizational
 genesis. Johnson (2001) proposes the concept of "path contingency" to reconcile the
 possibility of "choice and chance" and the importance of "past paths and institutional
 legacies" (Johnson 2001: 255). Both Stark (1992) and Johnson (2001) underscore the time
 dimension of institutional transformation and the importance of sequencing and cumulative
 stages. Certain studies suggest the importance of interpretation as a mechanism for opening
 up the possibility for change. Fligstein (1990), for example, looks at the role of courts and
 court interpretation, Garud and Karnme (2001) consider the "mindful deviation" associated
 with entrepreneurs, and Campbell (2004) explores the role of ideas in institutional
 transformation. Other contributions point to the importance of the "diffusion" of institutions
 and institutional elements and to associated processes of translation, adaptation, and
 hybridization (Westney 1987; Djelic 1998; Jacoby 2000). Crouch and Farrell (2002),
 Schneiberg (2006) and Sorge (2005) emphasize the fact that a multiplicity of institutional
 repertoires, including contradictory ones, can coexist in a particular institutional space. At
 any point in time, some may be active and others dormant, but subtle external or internal
 pressures may lead to a re-balancing (Morgan and Quack 2005). Thelen (2003) talks of
 institutional conversion. Existing institutional structures are redirected to new purposes and
 in a sense "revisited." She identifies "layering" as another mechanism where new
 institutional arrangements are "layered" upon pre-existing ones. In general, the model of
 change that emerges from Thelen's work as well as from some other recent contributions
 within the literature breaks away from the model of punctuated equilibrium and points
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 instead to the cumulative effects of ongoing and often subtle changes (Djelic and Quack
 2003b; Streeck and Thelen 2005b; Thelen 2003, 2004).
 Another way to look at mechanisms of change is to go back to the mechanisms of
 stability identified above. Ebbinghaus (2005) proposes that different sources of stability
 will be sensitive to different pressures for change. A logic of stability that has to do with
 increasing returns will be sensitive to decreased efficiencies. A policy feedback and power-
 induced stability can be questioned by shifting power relations. Institutional complemen-
 tarities can work towards stability, but a tight interdependence between institutional subsets
 could also mean that when a particular subsystem evolves, the entire system is under
 pressure. Finally, legitimacy and socialized stability are sensitive to a conflict of scripts and
 to the emergence of alternative ideas and paradigms that are relayed by organized interests.
 Open systems, crooked paths, and nested path generation
 We build upon those recent efforts at reintroducing gradual but significant change (Djelic
 and Quack 2003b; Streeck and Thelen 2005b). This article focuses on path generation as a
 continuous and complex process that can be studied only through time and that generally
 occurs in a series of successive and cumulative stages (Johnson 2001). Path generation does
 not necessarily imply the creation of a new path "from scratch." Instead, this may be a
 process of dynamic combination and recombination where legacies play an important but
 non-deterministic role, and where diffusion, layering, conversion, and bricolage are
 instrumental (Douglas 1986). The cumulative effects of combination and recombination
 over time can ultimately generate consequential institutional change.
 Path generation must be seen as a "political" process of emergent nature. Different
 societal actors with different economic and political interests, normative orientations and
 social identities strive to shape the institutional rules used to govern the overall societal
 system or specific subsystems (see Kleiner 2003; McNichol and Bensedrine 2003; Morgan
 and Kubo 2005; but also Djelic 1998; Jacoby 2000). In doing so, they draw on an existing
 institutional repertoire of variably acceptable courses of action that leave considerable scope
 for strategic and tactical decision-making by purposeful actors (Clemens and Cook 1999;
 Mayntz and Scharpf 1995). Path generation is therefore a highly complex phenomenon that
 often involves a sequence and accumulation of events over a long period of time. The
 complexity of actor constellations means that the paths are likely to develop emergent
 qualities, i.e., characteristics not directly intended by any of the actors involved (Djelic
 1998; Jacoby 2000; Stark 1992). Our understanding of path generation resembles Garud
 and Karnoe's (2001) concept of "path creation" in that it emphasizes reflexive agency and
 cumulative processes of gradual change, but differs in the degree to which actors are
 considered capable of strategically and intentionally creating and shaping path dependen-
 cies. While Garud and Kamrnoe (2001) put entrepreneurial activity at the center of path
 creation in technology fields, we point to the potentially unintended effects of behaviors in
 complex social processes and to the consequent emergent qualities of institutional schemes.
 The complexity of path generation increases considerably when we move our focus from
 technology and organizational fields to national institutional systems. It increases even further if
 we treat national institutional systems as potentially open systems in the double sense that they
 interact with each other while being embedded or nested within transnational institutional
 structures (Djelic and Quack 2003a; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Scott 2001). The
 intensity of interaction between national systems may vary, as does the "tightness" of
 connections between subsystems. Because of openness and nestedness, there are likely to be
 multiple points of pressure where national subsystems might be subject to change, e.g.,
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 through transfers, diffusion, "conversions," "layering," or through the revival of "dormant
 logics" (Crouch 2005a; Schneiberg 2007; Sorge 2005; Streeck and Thelen 2005a).
 Openness and nestedness therefore lead to complex logics of change. Because there are
 multiple points of pressure for change, it is difficult to predict the aggregate or cumulative
 results. The multiplicity of institutional seeds and the interactions between various action
 logics arising from these seeds are likely to lead to paths of change with emergent qualities.
 The paths cleared along the way are likely to be crooked since they reflect an accumulation
 of struggles, negotiations, and recombinations. Critical junctures can play a role, but we
 compare them to small clearings in a jungle. For a path to emerge from the clearing, critical
 junctures have to generate a number of incremental and cumulative steps that can extend
 over long stretches of time. The ultimate course of each path can only be identified and
 described post hoc - it is not pre-determined by any single critical juncture.
 Path generation through collision: the US competition regime in Germany
 Our first pair of case studies focuses on the German competition regime after 1945. The
 overall geopolitical context and a profound national crisis meant that the German system was
 relatively open then to international influences. We start by considering the attempted transfer
 of the US competition regime to Germany and then compare resulting developments in
 product markets and in the banking sector. Although the two cases have quite similar starting
 conditions and dynamics, their outcomes proved rather different. Some reinforcing
 mechanisms generated momentum towards a new path or towards a path deviation in one
 the case, and secured the reproduction and entrenchment of existing path dependencies in the
 other. Details of the analysis have been presented elsewhere (Djelic and Quack 2005; Quack
 and Djelic 2005), hence we concentrate here on key results and conclusions.
 Breaking the old path: the postwar competition regime for product markets
 In 1945, Germany was not the only European country with a tradition of cartelization, but it
 probably was the country where the systematic organization of markets had gone furthest. A
 key factor that eventually led to a shift in rules governing competition in product markets in
 Germany was the significant pressure exerted by the United States and the alternative model it
 represented. Since the American military command in Germany was convinced that cartels
 and large conglomerates had played an important role in the rise of the Nazi regime, it insisted
 on the decartelization and deconcentration of post-1945 German industry (Damm 1958).
 After the occupation statute was signed in 1949, Germany was allowed to regain its
 sovereignty progressively. Still, the American government insisted that certain policy fields
 like decartelization and financial decentralization would remain under the full control and
 scrutiny of the Allied High Commission, which succeeded the Allied military command
 (Berghahn 1986; Djelic 1998; Horstmann 1991). The newly founded Federal Republic of
 Germany was to draft its own legislation in competition matters, albeit under the direct and
 close supervision of American authorities.
 Seven years of heated debate and fierce negotiation followed. Numerous draft proposals
 and parliamentary votes were needed before the Law against Restraints on Competition
 (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen, GWB) was finally passed in 1957. This law
 was a clear departure from the legacy of cartelization in German product markets. It set a
 new institutional trajectory built in part on dormant German traditions of liberal market
 regulation dating back to the nineteenth century (Quack 2006).
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 The American military administration in Germany understood from the start that
 mobilization of local support was crucial for the stabilization of this alternative approach to
 competition and cooperation in Germany. While searching for Germans sympathetic to their
 goals and perspectives on competition, the Americans found support in a small group of
 "ordo-liberal" economists from the so-called "Freiburg school" and a few practitioners who
 had been involved in the competition administration during the Weimar Republic. These
 groups were interested in collaborating with the Americans in hopes of gaining national
 leverage for their own projects and perspectives.
 Ordo-liberals had been marginal in Germany before the end of World War II, with little
 intellectual and institutional impact. Nonetheless, their ideas were German seeds onto
 which American antitrust pressure could be grafted. The support of American occupation
 authorities brought a number of ordo-liberals into key institutional positions of power from
 which they could influence political circles and business communities. As Economic
 Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ludwig Erhard was a central figure from
 1949 onwards. Erhard served as mediator between the American military command and the
 German resistance and opposition. He remained an eminent proponent of a general ban on
 cartels during the following parliamentary discussions and negotiations on the Law against
 Restraints on Competition. The ordo-liberals around Erhard were ultimately able to engage
 in public discussions over the pros and cons of an economic constitution for the newly
 founded Federal Republic of Germany, linking the choice of a new competition regime to
 general political issues of democracy and social justice.
 There was fierce opposition to the general ban on cartels. During the immediate post-war
 period, informal agreements quite reminiscent of wartime cartels continued to operate on an
 illegal basis, particularly in industries with a longstanding cartel tradition. The majority of
 German business leaders were strongly opposed to antitrust legislation (Hiittenberger 1976;
 Robert 1976). As soon as industrial associations became re-established in the late 1940s
 and early 1950s, they began to lobby in favor of established and traditional cartel rules and
 practices. Under the leadership of Fritz Berg, the Federal Association of German Industries
 (Bundesverband Deutscher Industrien, BDI) became a vocal defender of cartels (Djelic
 1998). Only the retail sector and some small and medium-sized businesses, particularly
 those represented by the Association of Entrepreneurs (Arbeitsgemeinschaft selbstdndiger
 Unternehmer, AsU), were supportive of the antitrust policy because they hoped that such a
 ban could protect them from the pressures of "big business" (Berghahn 1986).
 Nevertheless, the concept of the legitimacy of cartels was still deeply entrenched, even
 within those groups, and it was generally acknowledged that certain exceptions to the
 antitrust rule were necessary or at least acceptable. Political parties were split on the issue.
 Hence, the re-ordering of product markets in postwar Germany started from and with the
 encounter between dominant foreign and peripheral domestic actors. Once local stake-
 holders had gained access to important institutional positions of power and were able to
 relay their project in broad parts of society, dynamics internal to Germany gained
 momentum and proved quite significant for the long-term stabilization of change. Despite
 all the compromises made in the course of negotiation, the Law against Restraints on
 Competition, when it went into force in 1957, played a decisive part in the generation of the
 new competition regime. Cartel agreements with restrictive effects on competition were
 declared null and void, and a newly created Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) was
 put in charge of monitoring, and if necessary, sanctioning violations of the law. The general
 prohibition of price and quota cartels and the establishment of the Federal Cartel Office did
 significantly alter the business behavior of German companies, even though it took quite
 some time in a number of cases.
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 Even though the overall number of cartel agreements registered with the Federal Cartel
 Office dropped considerably after the passing of the law, informal arrangements continued
 and occasionally became subject to official investigations. In the 1970s, according to
 Nawrocki (1973), business managers entangled in illegal cartel activities could count on
 understanding judges - to the dissatisfaction of FCO officials. As this shows, it took much
 more than the passage of the Law on Restraints on Competition to stabilize the new
 competition regime. The Federal Cartel Office initially pursued an explicit policy of
 dialogue and negotiation, but subsequently resorted to more coercive methods.
 Several reinforcing mechanisms played a role. These included increasing returns for
 companies and economic sectors for which the disadvantages of (national) cartelization
 outweighed the advantages (Herrigel 1996; Sorge 2005), cognitive effects generated by new
 legal categories, and increasing public legitimacy of the FCO and competition policy as part
 of the German "economic miracle." Some of the most influential factors were probably
 policy feedbacks from the new institutional order on power distribution and interest
 articulation of the next generation of business leaders. According to Berghahn (1986), the
 Law against Restraints on Competition started a learning process in parts of the German
 business community. More and more stakeholders criticized the cartel strategies as
 inappropriate to achieve a leading position in national and international markets. The
 sectoral shift from traditionally cartelized heavy industries to less cartelized consumer
 goods industries as well as the socializing effects of the new competition regime and the
 strong influence of American management methods on the younger generation of managers
 in the 1960s and 1970s facilitated this reorientation among business leaders (Berghahn
 1986; Djelic 1998). Factors that promoted the progressive re-integration of West Germany
 into the world economy, particularly the Marshall Plan and the emergence of a European
 market, furthered this learning process.
 A special type of policy feedback evolved through the antitrust regime that was being
 established at the European level. Antitrust provisions emerged as an important feature of
 the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), founded in 1951, and the European
 Economic Community (EEC), established with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Djelic 2002).
 German politicians and competition officials, many of whom represented the ordo-liberal
 tradition, played an influential role in framing and implementing the European competition
 regime during the 1960s and 1970s. The concomitant and partly interconnected
 development of European antitrust law eventually became a stabilizing factor for the new
 competition regime in German product markets. In the 1970s, representatives of the
 German Federal Cartel Office, when confronted with negligent attitudes towards cartels in
 court investigations, could then cite European anti-trust legislation and directives in order to
 strengthen their own position (Quack and Djelic 2005). European competition regulations
 and the epistemic community supporting them therefore became a force that could be
 mobilized in support of the German competition regime.
 The postwar story of competition regime shift in Japan would tend to confirm this
 (Haley 2001). Although the Japanese story shared a lot of features with the German one, the
 resulting institutional transformation in Japan was neither as significant nor as stable in the
 long run as it has been in Germany. One of the explanations, we propose, is that the shift in
 the competition regime in German product markets was stabilized and reinforced over time
 by the development and emergence of another "layer" of antitrust at the transnational or
 European level. Such reinforcing pressure was entirely absent in Japan.
 Still, the clear break in the dominant governance mode of product markets in postwar
 Germany, which shifted away from cartelization towards competition, did not preclude
 continuity. Business leaders and politicians, who increasingly rejected cartelization, were
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 often among those who actively worked towards promoting a further growth of German
 "combines" and re-restablishing German company networks between industrial firms and
 between industrial firms and banks (Beyer 1998; Streeck and H6pner 2003; Windolf and
 Beyer 1995). These forms, however, should not be regarded as simple substitute for the
 industrial cartels of the inter-war period (Shonfield 1977 [1965]). The combination of a
 clear break with the cartel tradition and the continuation and reinvention of other forms of
 economic coordination played an important role in structuring what was identified in the
 1970s as a specific German model of "diversified quality production" (Streeck 1991).
 Reinforcing the old path: postwar competition regime in the banking sector
 At the end of World War II, the American military government favored a similar far-
 reaching change of the competition regime in the banking sector. When Joseph Dodge, an
 American banker, took charge of financial and banking policy within the American military
 government (OMGUS) in September 1945, he announced that the German banking sector
 would be decentralized and decartelized in such a way that "the German financial hierarchy
 will never play any part in disturbing the peace of the World" again (cited in Horstmann
 1991: 64). A novel banking structure and competition regime was also to be established
 based on the American experience.
 However, the impact of the Dodge Plan was not as deep or long-lasting as expected.
 First of all, it met with considerable opposition from the Allied Control Council. The
 British and Soviet military governments had conflicting aims and strategies regarding the
 future development of the German banking sector. In October 1946, the Allied Control
 Council acknowledged that no agreement could be reached and left the military governors
 to proceed as they wished in their respective zones of occupation. However, as future
 developments would show, the banking system could not be reformed by the individual
 occupied sectors independent of each other. Another important reason for the failure of the
 Dodge Plan was the inability of the American military government to mobilize local
 support. With few exceptions, the reactions of the German state (Ldnder) politicians were
 negative. Even politicians like Ludwig Erhard, who endorsed new competition legislation
 with a strong ban on cartels, thought that Germany's unified and universal banking system
 corresponded to the structure of the overall economy and therefore could not be split into
 parts without endangering the stability and liquidity of the economy as a whole.
 Representatives of private banks who had started to lobby German politicians immediately
 after the war with the goal of preventing major changes in the banking system objected to
 cooperation with American authorities.
 OMGUS therefore imposed an order launching decentralization and prohibiting any
 informal contact between banks in the different German states. The Western Allied
 governments proposed the idea of having a bi- or trizonal central bank. By 1948, it seemed
 that key features of the Dodge plan were finally becoming reality in the three Western
 zones. However, the old German banking elites were merely re-asserting their leadership
 under the guise of apparent formal changes. Hermann J. Abs, a former board member of the
 Deutsche Bank, had been in close contact with the British military government since 1946.
 Abs became a key figure in mobilizing private banks against decentralization of the German
 banking sector. Private bank representatives launched a massive media campaign and
 strategically exploited the disagreement between the different Allied military governments
 (Horstmann 1991).
 Time was on the side of the German opposition: the American influence gradually
 dwindled with the return to German sovereignty. Not surprisingly, a law passed shortly after
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 the foundation of the German Federal Republic allowed private banks to recombine along
 the lines of the former banking groups. Compared to the original American plans for a
 reorganization of the German banking sector, the outcomes of the actual reform process
 appeared quite different at the end of the 1950s. Instead, one finds significant evidence of
 continuity with respect to the structure and functioning of the German banking system
 across and beyond the Nazi period and World War II (Scholtyseck 2000).
 During the subsequent discussion on a Law against Restraints on Competition, actors
 from the banking sector proved similarly successful in preventing any kind of deeper
 change. Since the financial crisis of the 1930s, the German banking sector had been
 governed by cartel agreements that involved recommendations on interest rates. Soon after
 World War II, banks and banking associations pleaded for a continuation of these sector-
 specific restrictions on competition. Their main argument was that free competition in the
 banking sector would quickly undermine the stability and security of the overall financial
 system. Bank supervision authorities in the different German states generally accepted this
 argument and declared cartel agreements in their respective sector valid in principle
 (Hausleutner 1970: 47f., 86f.).
 The planned Law against Restraints on Competition loomed as a serious challenge to the
 existing coordination of interest rates and, more generally, to restrictions on competition
 within the German banking sector. With the support of financial supervisory authorities and
 of several state governments, private banks and bank associations successfully lobbied to
 have the financial sector exempted from the law (Hiittenberger 1976; Robert 1976; Schmidt
 1995).' This allowed banks and banking associations officially to continue their practice of
 negotiating and coordinating interest rates until the federal government declared the policy
 invalid in 1967. Even after that, several banking associations continued to propose and
 submit recommendations on credit interest rates to the Federal Cartel Office (Hausleutner
 1970: 111 f.). In the absence of any significant domestic opposition, the tradition of interest
 cartels was re-established as an exemption to both the changing national competition
 regime and to the more sweeping anti-trust regime that was to be established at the
 European level (formally including the financial sector).
 More than 30 years passed before the exemption of the financial sector from the Law
 against Restraints on Competition (GWB) came under pressure for repeal. Three
 developments preceded and prepared the 1990 reform of Section 102 GWB. From the
 mid-1970s on, the Federal Cartel Office (FCO) systematically took action against collusive
 behavior. It adopted a much more critical position on the issue of interest rate
 recommendations in the banking sector (Schmidt 1995: 77). During the 1980s, the FCO
 received support from the EC's Directorate General IV, which launched an increasing
 number of investigations into cases of anti-competitive behavior in the European financial
 sector. In each case, the European Court of Justice ruled that the European competition law
 was applicable in all sectors without exemption. European competition law began to
 penetrate more and more deeply into national administrative and legal decision-making and
 finally forced the relevant German actors to adapt national legislation according to
 European standards (Quack and Djelic 2005; Schmidt 1995: 26). At the same time, large
 private banks in Germany exhibited a reorientation from national to international (often
 European) markets and from universal to investment banking (Morgan and Quack 2000;
 A special law concerned with the regulation of the banking sector (Kreditwesengesetz (KWG)), was enacted
 in July 1961. It indicated the conditions under which banks would be allowed to operate but did not touch
 upon questions of competition in this sector (Hausleutner 1970: 137ff.).
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 Vitols 2001). Liberalization of financial markets as well as increasing international
 competition among banks undermined the collective capabilities of large private banks
 with respect to sectoral self-organization and market coordination (Deeg 2005; Hipner and
 Krempel 2003; Lane 2005; Liitz 2002).
 Lessons learned from the comparison
 The two stories exhibit similarities as well as differences. In both the product markets and
 the banking sector, the initial impulse was exogenous and triggered by a critical juncture.
 The initiative for change came from the American military government and coincided with
 a situation of national crisis and self-questioning. In both cases, this initial impulse was
 also an attempt at pressing for increasing competition where cartelization had been the
 structuring principle. In other words, the distance between pre-existing institutions and
 the planned institutional change was quite significant. At the beginning of the process,
 the American military government was in a position to exert considerable power over the
 future development in both sectors. Neither of the two stories, however, is that of institutional
 path generation "from scratch." Instead, both cases point to associated processes of diffusion,
 translation, layering and - more generally - recombination. In both stories, such institutional
 recombination involved many struggles and confrontations over a period of time - nearly
 10 years in the first case, and much more in the second. Furthermore, an apparent step in the
 direction of change might soon lead to severe backlash, and vice versa.
 In spite of a number of initial similarities, the long-term outcomes of the two stories are
 quite distinct. In the case of product markets, the crooked path ultimately led to a significant
 transformation of formal institutions, which itself triggered and was reinforced by the
 progressive reorientation of economic actors away from cartelization and towards oli-
 gopolistic specialization. The American military government had managed to connect with
 local relays and was therefore able to find support and to generate legitimacy for the new
 policy within parts of the German business and political community. These local relays were
 also crucial for establishing the legal and administrative institutions that would socialize the
 next generation to a new and substantively different approach towards competition law. In
 this case, we do indeed observe "gradual but consequential change" (Djelic and Quack
 2003b: 309), a process of path generation through "gradual transformation" (Streeck and
 Thelen 2005b: 9). This process involved a shift from direct exertion of power towards more
 subtle ways of generating legitimacy and achieving socialization.
 In the banking sector, on the other hand, quite drastic formal changes originally
 introduced by the Allied occupation government did not prove stable and were
 progressively displaced and abandoned. The strength and coherence of German opposition
 worked in concert with an evolving geopolitical context and a highly constrained and
 constraining local financial system to deflect and tame the changes. Core players from the
 German banking sector managed to defend and maintain cartelization in the financial sector
 well after the 1958 law prohibited cartelization in most industries and product markets. For
 quite some time, path dependencies or even "past dependencies" in the banking sector
 seemed to absorb change pressures.
 We identified three important differences between our two cases that go a long way in
 explaining the differing outcomes. First, changes in the competition regime of product
 markets are a prime example of a well-functioning "pincer movement." In "pincer
 movement," external pressure and actors find local relays and coalitions that are both
 sympathetic to the change project and have enough leverage and resources to have an
 impact. The impact of such a pincer movement on attempts to transform organizations and
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 institutions has already been documented and theorized (Djelic 1998; Djelic and Quack
 2003c: 25; Jacoby 2000). In the banking case, the Americans clearly failed to forge an
 alliance with a local "coalition of the willing." They failed in fact altogether to identify the
 groups that could have constituted such a coalition. The absence of local relays and
 champions in this case meant that the pincer had only one arm. Direct exertion of power
 was not transformed into local support, legitimacy or any form of socialization. Second, the
 importance of structural obstacles should not be underestimated. After 1945, the German
 economy was in dire straits; although means to finance reconstruction were urgently
 needed, there were no alternatives to the German banking system. In particular, the
 underdevelopment of stock markets meant that both American occupation authorities and
 the few domestic proponents of decentralization of the banking sector had difficulties in
 pointing to a viable alternative to universal banks. Such structural limitations gave the old
 banking elites significant leverage and the capacity to mobilize public opinion and political
 support in their own interest. Finally, in the products market, the possibility of introducing
 another layer of pressure from outside the system was available and seized upon much
 earlier than in the banking sector. In the case of product markets, ordo-liberal groups used
 appeals to European competition authorities at a rather early stage to stabilize and reinforce
 the impact of the Law against Restraints on Competition. In the financial sector, on the
 other hand, European competition regulation remained "dormant" for a rather long time
 before it was re-activated by interested stakeholders during the 1990s.
 Path generation in the transnational void: setting international standards
 The second pair of cases illustrates the generation of new institutional paths in the
 transnational sphere and their possible reflection upon national institutional trajectories.
 International standard-setting organizations and networks are important actors in the
 generation of transnational institutional paths (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000; Tamm
 Hallstrdm 2004). They contribute actively to the creation of rules in what used to be an
 overall institutional void. This section reflects on two international standard-setting
 organizations or networks: the IASC (International Accounting Standards Committee) and
 the ICN (International Competition Network). We discuss here their role in generating a
 new path in transnational rule-setting and the possible impact of this at the national level.
 The IASC: International Accounting Standards and path generation
 Since the emergence of nation-states in the nineteenth century until well into the second half
 of the twentieth century, accounting rules were drafted, implemented and enforced within
 national jurisdictions. In the last decades, however, there has been a proliferation of activities
 and initiatives to make accounting standards comparable and compatible across national
 borders. The internationalization of business, the rise of multinational companies and the
 growth of international capital markets have induced various international organizations in
 the postwar period, and particularly since the 1970s, to work towards a cross-border
 harmonization of accounting rules (for a detailed account see Botzem and Quack 2006).
 When attempting to introduce international accounting rules, one must overcome deeply
 entrenched national differences in practices and ethical norms of private and public
 stakeholders involved. Accounting rules in Anglo-Saxon countries are predominantly
 oriented towards the interests of investors, whereas those in continental European (and
 Japanese) countries are primarily concerned with the interests of creditors. Common and
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 Roman law countries also differ with regard to the way in which accounting rules were
 defined and meant to be changed, i.e., through case law or statutory law. The linkage of
 financial accounting to taxation further distinguishes countries such as Germany, where
 annual accounting reports are the basis for company taxation, from countries like the United
 States, where financial and tax accounting are independent of each other.
 Here, we concentrate mainly on the development of International Accounting Standards
 (IAS) by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and its successor, the
 International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). However, it is important to note that the
 European Community was also active. In the mid-1960s, the EC had already launched an
 initiative to harmonize national systems of regulation in order to improve the comparability
 of financial statements from different companies within the Common Market. A task force
 had been established to prepare a European accounting directive, but Member State
 governments opposed the resulting draft essentially because they were not willing to give
 up their sovereignty on tax-related issues.
 The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was established by British
 professional accounting associations in 1973, partly in reaction to the continental European
 influence in the European Community harmonization project. The founding members of the
 IASC included representatives of national professional accounting bodies from Australia,
 Canada, France, West Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, and the
 United States. The primary purpose of the IASC was to develop basic standards that could
 be rapidly accepted and implemented worldwide to improve the quality and comparability
 of international financial accounting (Samuels and Piper 1985: 70).
 The early years of the IASC were characterized by the elaboration and gradual
 institutionalization of a procedural framework that would allow different national and
 sectoral accounting norms and philosophies to be articulated and the opinions and
 experiences of potential rule recipients to be heard. This procedural framework was largely
 inspired by the "due process" of the American standard-setter, the Financial Accounting
 Standards Board (FASB), which had been established in 1973 to deal with a wide range of
 different constituencies. After identifying salient accounting issues, the IASC would set up
 technical committees to work out a discussion memorandum to be approved by the IASC
 Board. The memorandum would be published and the public invited to comment on the
 draft within a fixed period of time. Subsequently, the IASC Board would compose an
 exposure draft and make it available to the public for further comments. Finally, the IASC
 Board would vote whether the exposure draft should be adopted or withdrawn and revised
 (Ballwieser 1998; Vorwold 2000).
 This more formalized framework evolved in a rather informal manner. The bulk of
 discussions took place among experts delegated by international accounting firms or
 professional associations to the IASC's technical committees (Tamm Hallstrom 2004). The
 IASC gave them the opportunity to exchange information, to gain a better understanding of
 practices in other countries, or to learn about accounting standards in general (e.g., for
 representatives of developing countries with no accounting rules of their own). In this way,
 the IASC gave birth to a small community of international accounting experts who acted as
 bridging posts between different national accounting systems. The International Accounting
 Standards (IAS) published during the first 15 years of IASC existence have been
 characterized as "consensus standards" because they consisted essentially of a collection
 of accepted practices in various countries (Thorell and Whittington 1994: 224). Some IAS
 options were so broad that they could be used under different financial reporting systems
 ranging from the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles of the USA (US GAAP) on the
 one hand to the German commercial law code (HGB) on the other (Daley and Mueller
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 1982: 45). By the early 1980s, the IASC had established itself as an international arena for
 accounting standard-setting and had fostered the development of an international expert
 community, but its standards still lacked coherence, legitimacy, and recognition.
 From the mid-1980s onwards, IAS standards became more focused on and oriented
 towards the Anglo-American accounting tradition. This change was partly engineered by
 the IASC and partly attributable to external economic and political transformation
 processes. To gain support and legitimacy for its standards, the IASC had an explicit
 policy of offering membership status to other organizations as a means of co-optation.
 Constitutional amendments in 1977 and 1982 abolished the bias that had favored the nine
 founding members. A complete overhaul of the organizational set-up in 2001 further
 increased the influence of preparers and users of company accounts as compared to the
 accounting professionals. A successive expansion of membership in the Consultative Group
 and the introduction of an observer status in the IASC Board intensified liaisons with
 government and public stakeholders. The overall result of these measures was a shift in
 power and influence away from the representatives of the various national professional
 associations to the preparers (large accounting firms in the general Anglo-Saxon context)
 and users of financial reports.
 At the same time, the internationalization of capital markets, and particularly the
 increasing centrality of US stock exchanges for global capital flows, gave American
 accounting rules (US GAAP) a global reach and FASB, the American standard-setter, and
 the SEC more leverage in international standard-setting (Haller 2002). Both agencies
 viewed US GAAP as superior to IAS in terms of coherence and transparency, and they were
 not ready to list foreign companies on US stock exchanges unless these fulfilled the
 reporting requirements defined in US GAAP. This approach was subsequently adopted by
 the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).
 In the second half of the 1980s, IASC and IOSCO entered into discussions that led to the
 joint Comparability and Improvements Project in 1987 and to the affiliation of IOSCO with
 the Consultative Group of the IASC. The objective of the project was to reduce or eliminate
 alternatives within standards and to make standards more detailed and prescriptive. The
 IASC moved into a new stage of its work, described by Thorell and Whittington (1994:
 225) as the "normative period." Professional representatives of continental European and
 other countries diverging from the Anglo-Saxon model came increasingly under pressure to
 give up their accounting principles in order to raise the acceptance of IAS among financial
 market players (Kleekimper 1995; Nobes and Parker 1985). After a second round of
 revisions brought the IAS standards even more in line with Anglo-Saxon practices, the
 IOSCO advised its members in 2000 to allow multinational issuers to use IAS in cross-
 border offerings and listings.
 By the beginning of the new millennium, a clear pattern of international accounting
 standard-setting had emerged. While the boundaries, logics, and participants of the
 regulatory field had shifted from professional to financial market logic, the variety of
 accepted rules within IAS had been narrowed down to predominantly Anglo-Saxon
 principles of investor-oriented transparency and accountability. However, the future
 directions of international standard-setting in accounting will remain contested. While US
 regulators continue to insist on financial reporting according to US GAAP or on
 reconciliation of other reporting standards into US GAAP as a precondition for companies
 to be listed on US stock exchanges, IAS decision-making does not always follow the logic
 of Anglo-Saxon dominance. For example, the German proposal for share-based payment
 (IFRS 2) succeeded over more far-reaching Anglo-American suggestions. Consequently,
 the path is not yet firmly established but still very much in the making.
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 The changing logic of IAS standards made conflicts with national accounting rules even
 more acute. The clearing of a path for international accounting standard-setting affected
 national developments in this regulatory field in many ways. As outlined above, the IASC
 and its successor do not have any formal authority to impose their standards on companies
 and regulators in different national states. Nevertheless, the IASB and its IAS standards
 have led to decisive changes in continental European accounting systems. In 1998, for
 example, the German Commercial Code was amended to allow groups of companies the
 option of compiling their financial reports according to IAS (or US GAAP) instead of
 German accounting standards. As part of this legal reform, elements of IAS such as
 segment-based reporting and capital flow analysis were integrated into German law.
 Furthermore, accounting rules are no longer set by German legislators but by a German
 Accounting Standards Committee structured similar to the IASC (Botzem forthcoming).
 While similar adaptations can be observed in countries that tended to favor prudence
 principles (such as France and Japan), the American case indicates how geopolitical and
 economic power can immunize national accounting systems against influences from newly
 emerging international paths - even in times when national rules come under criticism
 because of public scandals such as the Enron case.
 The development of IAS has also affected developments in the European Union. In
 1995, the EU abandoned its own accounting standard-setting initiative to participate in the
 development of international accounting standards (Commission of the European
 Communities 1995). Since January 2005, IAS/IFRS has been mandatory for publicly
 traded companies in the EU, thus ruling out US GAAP as an accepted alternative
 (Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002). National governments may even extend the area of
 application of IAS/IFRS to other types of companies if they wish to do so.
 The ICN: a transnational forum for the spread of competition law
 In 1945, antitrust was essentially an American legal and regulatory tradition with no impact
 beyond the national borders of the United States. American antitrust reflected the double
 belief that competition should be the highest organizing principle and that the economy
 functions best when competitors have limits for permitted activities. Outside the United
 States, competition tended to be feared rather than fostered because of its potentially
 disruptive and chaotic consequences. Sixty years later, a major reversal of this trend has
 taken place. Competition has become the name of the game in both national and
 international economic spaces. Today, about one hundred countries have a competition
 policy and competition institutions that seem quite compatible, at first sight, with the
 American antitrust tradition. The last few years have also seen multiple attempts at fostering
 antitrust principles and institutions within the transnational space as well as initiatives to
 spread a "culture" of antitrust.
 In the story recounted here, path generation at the transnational level was preceded by a
 long preparatory period when antitrust principles diffused progressively to a number of
 jurisdictions. There were several stages to that process of diffusion. An early movement
 was the direct transfer of an American model to a few other countries - Germany in
 particular - and the budding European community. As mentioned above, this movement
 started in the late 1940s and was a progressive, step-by-step, cumulative, and contested
 process. Another stage was the grafting of antitrust principles onto the genetic code, as it
 were, of key international organizations such as the GATT. The prohibition of cartels and
 agreements was put forth in Chapter V of the Havana Charter - the foundation document of
 the GATT and thus of the World Trade Organization (Zeiler 1999).
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 A third stage came in the 1980s. Three developments then gave a new and important
 impetus to the spread of antitrust across borders. Chronologically, the revival of the
 European construction effort came first. The European Single Act was signed in 1986 and
 paved the way to the negotiations that led to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. This process
 clearly boosted activity around antitrust at the community level. One of the more direct and
 significant consequences was the enactment of a European Merger Regulation in 1989
 giving the European Commission "the exclusive power to investigate mergers with a
 community dimension." Then, in turn, such activity and activism at the European level
 trickled down to the level of the member states. Both old and new member states developed
 and/or modernized their antitrust acts and structures in the late 1980s and early 1990s to fit
 the European Union's antitrust template. A second important development was the fall of
 the Berlin Wall and the resulting "extension of the West." With respect to antitrust, this
 triggered a wave of international missionary activity unprecedented since the early 1950s
 and on a scale and scope much greater than had been the case before. Both American and
 European antitrust authorities were actively trying to "export the rules of competition
 regulation," first to Eastern and Central Europe, and soon also to many other areas in the
 world (Djelic and Kleiner 2006; Muris 2002; Pittman 1998; Rouam et al. 1994). A third
 important development is the episode of economic internationalization or globalization that
 gained momentum during the 1990s. Globalization and the multiplication of jurisdictions
 with competition law systems have undeniably created new constraints and challenges. The
 problem of overlapping jurisdictions and the associated risks of inconsistent or conflicting
 regulation and decisions have become particularly salient (Jalabert-Doury 2003; Monti
 2002).
 The new challenge for the antitrust world is therefore to create conditions for a better co-
 ordination of existing regimes and jurisdictions. This has been the objective of the latest
 phase of development. Since the 1990s, transnationalization of competition regulation,
 standards, and practices has been the main project. A first strategy was to develop bilateral
 agreements as a forum to ensure reciprocal understanding. These bilateral agreements have
 had undeniably positive results (Melamed 2000). This is particularly true of the EU/US
 connection (Schaub 2000). However, inherent limitations of bilateral agreements have also
 been revealed. It became clear in some cases that different legal systems, different
 procedures, different analyses of the same facts, and possibly different political perspectives
 could lead to different appraisals of the same operation by two authorities, in spite of the
 existence of mechanisms for bilateral cooperation (Djelic and Kleiner 2006). As a result,
 multilateral initiatives progressively grew in significance. These initiatives followed
 different routes that revealed conflicting perspectives and divergent opinions as to the
 purpose and desired scope of multilateral agreements.
 In the 1980s, the OECD was promoting international discussion of competition policy
 matters within its longstanding working group, the Competition Law and Policy Committee
 (CLP), as well as within a working group that brought together CLP and OECD Trade
 Committee members. The CLP has worked particularly well as a forum for promoting soft
 convergence of competition policies among its members and for providing technical
 assistance to certain OECD observers and non-members. It has not, however, achieved
 much success in rule-making or dispute settlement, and convergence has been more in
 terms of understandings and principles than in terms of rules, processes, and practices.
 Efforts were also undertaken by the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 1994, EU
 Commissioner Van Miert convened with a group of"wise men" to elaborate the stakes and
 challenges for competition policy. The Van Miert report, published in 1995, called for the
 elaboration of a "plurilateral framework for competition ensuring the respect of certain
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 basic competition principles" (Commission of the European Communities 1995). In 1996,
 the World Trade Organization (WTO) created a Competition Working Group under the
 strong influence of Karel Van Miert. In the beginning, this group had a limited mandate.
 The EU hoped to push it towards the negotiation of international rules, but the US and a
 number of other countries proved much more reticent (Van Miert 1997). A few years later,
 the EU again took the lead, suggesting that competition should be tackled in a new round of
 negotiations. In April 1999, Sir Leon Brittan, the former EU Competition Commissioner,
 proposed that "in negotiating a WTO agreement, we should aim for gradual convergence of
 approaches to anti-competitive practices that have a significant impact on international
 trade." So far, reactions to the EU position have been far from enthusiastic. Developing
 countries seem fairly skeptical that adopting a multilateral framework would bring
 economic benefits for them. The United States also insisted that any agreement should be
 voluntary and that it would be difficult to create a competition framework similar to the
 trade framework (Pons 2002; WTO 2000).
 In parallel to these EU-driven developments, the United States launched its own initiative
 in 1997: the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (Advisory Committee or
 ICPAC). Over the course of the next 2 years, the Advisory Committee held extensive public
 hearings in Washington attended by scholars, business executives, economists, lawyers, and
 competition officials from around the world. The ICPAC ultimately advised against the
 development of binding competition rules subject to dispute settlement within the WTO.
 Instead, it proposed a number of non-binding agreements (ICPAC 2000). ICPAC believed
 that binding agreements, like those the EU was pushing for within the WTO, were not the
 only way to develop cooperation in the field of competition policy or to facilitate further
 convergence and harmonization. The Advisory Committee argued that countries might be
 willing to cooperate in meaningful ways, but may not want to be legally bound to do so
 under international law. The ICPAC report therefore proposed a Global Competition
 Initiative to foster dialogue amongst antitrust officials as well as between officials and
 broader communities with a view to bringing about common understandings and a common
 culture and greater convergence of laws and analyses.
 The ICN was born 2 years later as a direct heir to the ICPAC report (Djelic and Kleiner
 2006). The ICN is a "project-oriented, consensus-based, informal network of antitrust
 agencies from developed and developing countries that will address antitrust enforcement
 and policy issues of common interest and formulate proposals for procedural and
 substantive convergence through a results-oriented agenda and structure" (ICN website).
 Membership is voluntary and open to any national or multinational competition authority
 entrusted with the enforcement of antitrust laws. The ICN is not only a virtual network, but
 also an open one. Concretely, this means that although only antitrust agencies can be
 members, interaction with a wider community is encouraged. The targets are "non-
 governmental advisers," that is, members of international organizations, representatives
 from consumer and industry associations, and practitioners of antitrust law, as well as
 members of the academic community. The founding fathers often assert their willingness to
 stimulate the emergence of what they call a "community of interest." Annual conferences
 provide a physical rallying point where this "community" comes together. The ICN has a
 double objective. First, it proposes to enhance collaboration between antitrust authorities so
 as to stimulate the development, spread, implementation, and monitoring of "seamless"
 practices and standards of competition regulation, and this within, across, and beyond
 national boundaries. The second objective is a more cultural one - to foster and encourage a
 belief and trust in the superiority of markets and competition within and beyond the
 antitrust community.
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 Learning from the comparison
 Both cases of path generation in the "transnational void" clearly show the importance of
 time, preparation, and multiple junctures, many of which were purely accidental and
 haphazard - "out of path," as it were. In both cases, a wide range of private and public
 actors with changing participation over time were involved in rule-setting. Both stories
 feature a multiplicity of parallel paths that may collide and conflict at certain times, and
 reinforce and strengthen each other at others. Several possible routes towards transnational
 institution-building existed, and those routes were constructed and furthered in parallel for
 rather long periods of time. Interestingly, one route may ultimately seem to become
 dominant while the others remain open and active, yet nothing can prevent us to think that
 it could not take over at a later stage (Schneiberg 2007).
 This comparison illustrates the complex nestedness of transnational and national
 institutional trajectories. Transnational rule-making in our two stories is strongly influenced
 by certain national institutional sets. The role of an American "model" is undeniable in both
 cases. At the same time, transnational rule-making is shaking and shaping national
 institutional trajectories. An interesting empirical question is the degree to which this does
 or does not include the United States. In other words, path generation at the transnational
 level reflects a complex process of recombination where certain national institutional
 legacies play a part. However, path generation at the transnational level also has an impact
 of variable strength and depth on national institutional systems.
 A feature that differentiates this pair of cases from the preceding one is that path
 generation at a transnational level proceeded largely in the absence of legislative coercion.
 While the US military government used direct force and coercive power in Germany after
 1945, the proponents of an Anglo-Saxon model had to use more subtle forms of hegemonic
 and discursive power in transnational negotiations. In the absence of legislative power,
 voluntary and network-like governance mechanisms were established to generate
 legitimacy and create the conditions for socialization. On both dimensions, the IASC and
 the ICN display characteristics that are typical for rule-setting at the transnational level
 (e.g., Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006).
 In these two cases, we can identify three mechanisms that link path generation at the
 transnational level with developments at the national level. First, increasing interaction and
 cultural homogenization of epistemic communities across borders proved helpful in shaping
 and stabilizing an emerging transnational path of rule-setting. Epistemic communities act as
 transmitters and mediators, to facilitate the direct and indirect impact of international rule
 setting on national institutional sets and systems. Second, the agreement among a majority
 of actors on common procedures for rule-setting, including procedures for the articulation
 of minority or deviant opinions and conflict resolution, contributed greatly to the sta-
 bilization of new paths. Third, the distinction between rule-makers and rule-followers
 progressively dissolved. Rule-setting thereby becomes a reflexive learning process, and the
 nature of the learning process itself adds legitimacy to the resulting rules in the eyes of the
 participants.
 Finally, these two cases also illustrate that transnational institutional paths are, to a large
 extent, cognitive and normative. Institutionalization and its reinforcing mechanisms at the
 transnational level tend to project a logic of appropriateness. In this context, socialization
 and the quest for legitimacy emerge as key mechanisms for institutional stabilization and
 reproduction. Transnational rule-setting is expected to have an impact, not through
 hierarchical enforcement, but through mutual influence, imitation, and learning, in
 particular between and across national and international standard-setting arenas. Both
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 stories thus point to the co-evolutionary nature of path generation and transformation at the
 transnational and national level, suggesting the need for closer analysis in future research of
 reinforcing and de-stabilizing effects across levels.
 Concluding remarks
 The four case studies we have described and contrasted in this article show that path
 generation in open systems can be complex, dense, and somewhat messy in real life. A
 comparison of evolutions across those four cases illustrates the conditions and limits for
 formation and change of institutional rules. The empirical material presented in this article
 generated several interesting insights and hypotheses.
 (1) The case studies presented here show that path generation can be a long-drawn and
 slow process. Path generation needs time. The progressive transformation of the
 German competition regime, the development of International Accounting Standards,
 and the emergence of an international competition regime all featured a succession of
 critical junctures and moments.
 (2) Punctuated equilibrium, i.e., a single radical and abrupt jump from one stage to another,
 was not observed. Instead, multidirectional struggles, an aggregation of decision points,
 and multiple critical junctures charted a posteriori a series of crooked paths. These
 crooked paths are made up of a complex accumulation of recombination episodes and a
 succession of small, sometimes apparently inconsequential steps, each of which has
 partly unintended consequences that stimulate unexpected reactions and developments.
 Legacies can play a variably determinant role in these episodes of recombination.
 Interpretation, diffusion, adaptation or translation, layering, conversion, and bricolage
 can all be instrumental processes. These crooked paths could not be precisely predicted
 at the beginning of the process; they can only be identified and ascertained post hoc.
 (3) The long-drawn process of path generation often relied on a combination of different
 mechanisms. While power and policy feedback were needed to generate momentum at
 the beginning of the process, the ability to gain legitimacy and to establish efficient
 ways of socialization became decisive for the stabilization at later stages. Power and
 policy feedback took different forms. In all cases, however, the exertion of power was
 necessary but insufficient for the stabilization of a new path or for the transformation
 of an existing path. The ability of certain actors to mobilize support and legitimacy for
 the new approach and to establish institutions that socialize other actors towards the
 new approach distinguishes the successful cases of path generation from the
 unsuccessful ones. Path generation studies should therefore give increased attention
 to the combined and interactive effects of different re-enforcement and stabilization
 mechanisms, particularly those with increasing returns, power and policy feedback on
 the one hand, and legitimacy and socialization on the other.
 (4) A configuration where perceived internal crisis, disruptions, or dysfunctions combine
 with external pressure is conducive to the emergence of this type of path generation.
 In particular, institutional systems or subsystems will be more likely to change when
 external pressures and solutions are connected to local stakeholders and their
 traditions through what we define as "pincer movement." We argue that the likelihood
 of path generation, i.e., the creation of a new path or a significant deviation from an
 existing path, increases when institutional systems or subsystems are attacked through
 pincer movement, both from inside and outside, and foreign as well as domestic actors
 a Springer
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 are able to mobilize various resources in favor of a common or at least compatible
 project (for more examples, see Djelic 1998; Djelic and Quack 2003c: 25; Jacoby 2000).
 (5) All four case studies show the importance of nested effects among institutional
 dynamics at the national and international level. Path generation through collision and
 path generation in the transnational void were both strongly influenced by specific
 national institutional trajectories such as the American or Anglo-Saxon model. These
 influences entered rule-setting at the transnational level as part of a complex process
 of recombination. At the same time, transnational rule-making had feedback effects on
 national institutional trajectories of variable strength and depth. The embeddeness of
 national institutional systems in transnational rule-making means that there are
 multiple points of pressure where national subsystems become subject to change.
 Our results suggest that the concept of path generation allows for a better specification of
 the conditions for change in existing paths and for the emergence of new paths in the case
 of open systems than the concept of path dependency. Path generation does not result from
 single critical junctures, but rather from a historical sequence of multiple junctures that
 cannot be fully anticipated. Such crooked paths show the interplay between pressures for
 continuity and stimuli for change - reinforcing mechanisms challenged by external and
 internal triggers for change. This type of constellation is likely to become more common in
 a world characterized by increasing cross-border and transnational interdependencies.
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